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499 
Symposium 
The United States Constitution (rev. ed.) 
How would you rewrite the United  
States Constitution? 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLITICAL 
COMMUNITY 
Michael C. Dorf* 
The history of constitutional change in the United States is 
in substantial part a history of expanding the political com-
munity. Although the state property qualifications for voting 
that were common at the Founding were abandoned without the 
need for a federal constitutional amendment, such amendments 
were used to widen the polity to include African Americans and 
other non-white men,1 women,2 residents of the District of 
Columbia,3 the poor,4 and young adults.5 Looking forward, one 
might ask what other groups now denied political representation 
could or should receive it in a more perfect Union. 
Without denying the importance of other aspects of 
constitutional design, one might think that the question of who 
constitutes the polity is both more basic and more outcome-
determinative of the collective decisions a polity will reach than 
are such still-important matters as whether to have a parlia-
mentary, presidential, or mixed system of government, whether 
to create a federal or unitary state, and whether and how to 
provide for constitutional adjudication outside of the political 
 
 * Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. For helpful comments 
and conversations, I thank Sherry Colb, Jill Hasday, and Steven Shiffrin. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
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organs of government. To put the point somewhat provocatively, 
the pre-Nineteenth Amendment male supremacists who argued 
that extending the franchise to women would alter the whole 
constitutional system were basically right.6 
Consider three groups whose interests the Constitution—
and the law more broadly—either ignores or grossly under-
counts: Non-citizens outside the United States;7 future 
generations of citizens;8 and non-human animals.9 Political 
decisions taken by the United States and its sub-units can and do 
have very substantial effects on members of these groups; yet the 
Constitution provides them with no effective mechanism to 
protect their interests. 
U.S. policy decisions profoundly affect non-citizens, future 
generations, and non-humans without seriously consulting any of 
them or otherwise considering their interests. For example, our 
military and political leaders decide how much, if at all, to weigh 
the value of non-citizen civilians sacrificed as “collateral 
damage” to advance the perceived national security interests of 
the United States, nominally bound by the international human-
itarian law of war, but not answerable at the polls to the foreign 
victims and their families. Likewise, politicians calculate the 
long-term costs of borrowing money or despoiling the limited 
resources of the natural environment, answerable only to the 
voters of here and now, not to those who will one day inhabit the 
 
 6. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 998–1003 (2002) (recounting anti-
suffrage arguments rooted in federalism purporting to show that even a constitutional 
amendment could not grant women the vote). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990) 
(holding Fourth Amendment inapplicable to search targeting Mexican citizen in Mexico 
conducted by United States agents). I set to one side permanent residents and other non-
citizens present in the United States because, while they lack a constitutional right to 
vote, the Constitution does protect them in other respects. For simplicity, in the balance 
of this Essay, I shall use the term “non-citizens” to mean “non-citizens outside the 
United States.” 
 8. It is difficult to find a citation to support this point exactly, although Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) will probably serve. See id. at 157 (“[I]n nearly all . . . 
instances, the use of the word [‘person’] is such that it has application only postnatally. 
None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application.”). From 
the fact that fetuses lack constitutional personhood, it would appear to follow a fortiori 
that as-yet unconceived generations lack constitutional personhood. 
 9. See, e.g., Int’l Primate Protection League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 
799 F.2d 934, 937–39 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding no standing for animal welfare activists to 
sue to enforce federal law governing treatment of animals used for research without 
pausing to consider the injuries to the monkeys themselves). As a general matter, 
American law treats non-human animals as property, with the consequence that it denies 
recognition to their rights and, except for very limited and largely ineffective protections, 
their interests. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995). 
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world that results. And human citizens decide whether it is 
acceptable to confine, exploit, inflict suffering upon, and kill 
non-human animals to satisfy human preferences for food, 
clothing, and other products. 
Suppose one thought that a just legal order would include 
mechanisms for giving substantial weight to the interests of non-
citizens, future generations, and/or non-human animals. What 
mechanisms could be designed to give them that weight? 
Direct political representation is ordinarily a useful starting 
point in answering such questions, but for future generations and 
non-humans, it is a non-starter. Even those non-human species 
(such as great apes and parrots) that can be taught to com-
municate in human language would not be capable of exercising 
the franchise intelligently. 
Giving voting rights to non-citizens is a theoretical 
possibility, but it faces practical obstacles and principled 
objections. A country that has recurring difficulty counting the 
votes of citizens of Florida would be utterly flummoxed at the 
prospect of counting votes worldwide, including votes of persons 
living under nondemocratic regimes unaccustomed and hostile 
to holding free and fair elections for domestic purposes, much 
less foreign ones. Moreover, even if the practical obstacles could 
be overcome, it is not at all obvious that the interests of non-
citizens should count equally with those of citizens, or even with 
one another. Would Mexicans and Canadians receive half-votes, 
with persons living farther away receiving quarter-votes? For 
roughly the same reason that the Supreme Court adopted the 
one-person-one-vote rule in Reynold v. Sims10 and its progeny,11 
any other voting formula would be arbitrary; yet one-person-
one-vote would over-value the interests of non-citizens—unless 
for an election to some sort of world government. 
World government—not in the literal sense but in the more 
limited sense of participation in international institutions—is a 
more promising avenue for ensuring that attention would be 
paid to the interests of non-citizens. Here, a change to the 
constitutional text would be useful. As famously stated in the 
Paquete Habana, “International law is part of our law.”12 True 
enough, but international law is a subordinate part of our law, 
valid only to the extent it is not superseded by a later-in-time 
 
 10. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 11. See, e.g., Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 12. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
!!!DORF-273-CONSTITUTIONANDPOLITICALCOMMUNITY.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  2:26 PM 
502 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:499 
 
statute or the Constitution. Suppose the following amendment, 
which would effectively modify the Supremacy Clause itself: “No 
law in conflict with international law shall be valid.” Thus 
amending the Constitution to require that U.S. law conform with 
international law—rather than vice-versa—would go at least 
some way towards ensuring that U.S. law takes account of the 
interests of non-citizens. 
Yet under the Westphalian system under which we still live, 
international law itself is largely a creation of sovereigns, 
including, especially, powerful sovereigns like the United States. 
One might worry that in a world in which the United States were 
more strongly bound by international law, the United States 
would withdraw from treaties and otherwise use its power to 
water down the content of international law. Still, the United 
States is not all-powerful. If coupled with domestic and inter-
national enforcement mechanisms, inverting the relationship 
between U.S. and international law would appear to be a 
promising mechanism for taking account of the interests of non-
citizens. 
To be sure, the people who now complain that our courts 
should not even look to international or foreign sources for 
interpretive guidance in construing American constitutional law13 
would undoubtedly oppose an effort to make international law 
superior to domestic law. And even those of us who think the 
objections lack force when directed against the current, quite 
limited use of foreign and international law, might concede that 
they make more sense as a critique of my thought-experiment. 
Giving international law real bite would in fact reduce the 
responsiveness of American law to American voters, making our 
system less “democratic” in some sense. But that is an inevitable 
consequence of giving greater voice to the interests of non-
Americans. Representation is more or less a zero-sum game, and 
to a significant extent, so is virtual representation. 
What about future generations? Near-term future 
generations benefit from some virtual representation. People 
care about their children and grandchildren in ways that affect 
both private decisions—such as providing for the health, 
education, and welfare of their offspring—and in their public 
policy decisions—such as in providing funding for education, 
environmental protection, and other programs that provide long-
term benefits. But such concerns have limited time horizons; 
 
 13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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environmental damage done today may have consequences ten 
or more generations from now, affecting people only faintly 
related to anyone now living (either as a matter of genetics or 
emotions). And even with respect to the near-term future, 
revealed preferences show only limited concern for leaving, in 
Locke’s terms, as much and as good for others.14 
It is not difficult to propose policies that would provide 
greater protection for future generations: less borrowing for 
consumption rather than investment on the economic side; less 
and more efficient use of the Earth’s resources on the 
environmental side. But the devil is both in the details and in 
human shortsightedness. Constitutional rules designed to 
promote fiscal responsibility, of the sort one finds in state 
constitutions, can lead to perverse outcomes, such as one-time 
sales of public resources or pension fund raids. And the 
classification of some spending as “investment” rather than 
“consumption,” while not infinitely manipulable, can be the sort 
of judgment call that will lead politicians to game any limits. 
Meanwhile, on the environmental side, Pigovian taxes on fossil 
fuels and consumption more broadly would be extraordinarily 
helpful, but likewise have been quite unpopular in the United 
States. The very factors that lead the United States to have the 
lowest gasoline taxes in the developed world would almost 
certainly frustrate any effort to write similar policies into the 
Constitution. Concerns about future generations thus seem 
likely to remain more a matter of political rhetoric than 
constitutional reality. 
I am likewise dubious about the power of constitutional 
change as a mechanism for protecting non-human animals. 
Indeed, as I shall explain momentarily, in the medium term I am 
dubious about the ability of any strategy for substantially 
improving the lives of non-human animals through law. 
In recent years, states have adopted animal welfare laws 
that regulate such matters as the size of the cages in which 
chickens, calves, and pigs can be confined, but so long as people 
insist on confining, exploiting, and killing billions of non-human 
animals for food and other purposes, it is difficult to imagine any 
 
 14. See JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT § 33 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690). Locke was 
discussing the origins of property appropriated by individuals as against others of their 
generation, but the point clearly holds inter-generationally as well. See, e.g., id. (“No 
body could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good 
draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst.”). 
!!!DORF-273-CONSTITUTIONANDPOLITICALCOMMUNITY.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  2:26 PM 
504 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:499 
 
protection for those animals against those very appropriations of 
their lives. Indeed, it can be argued that current welfare laws 
actually entrench the practice of animal exploitation. Such laws 
provide consumers with (mostly false) assurances that the animal 
products they consume were produced without inflicting 
suffering on animals, thus stabilizing or perhaps even increasing 
demand for these products. So long as our politics only allow 
such feeble laws, it is not clear that people who care about the 
wellbeing of non-human animals should seek their enactment. 
Changes in behavior must precede receptivity to legal changes 
that would actually make a difference—such as a constitutional 
right of sentient creatures not to be eaten or otherwise treated as 
things. I would favor such a right, but I do not expect to see it in 
my lifetime. 
So much for the possibilities of further expanding the polity 
in ways that parallel the changes wrought by the Fifteenth, 
Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments. Now consider whether we might want to shrink 
the polity. Here I shall briefly consider how the Constitution 
provides considerable protection for, or at least reflects the 
wishes of, two groups whose interests would appear to be much 
less substantial than those just noted—namely, corporations and 
dead people. 
It remains to be seen whether Citizens United v. FEC15 
substantially changes campaign finance or politics more broadly 
in the United States, in the way that its critics fear.16 In my view, 
large corporations, unions, other associations, and wealthy 
individuals already had ample opportunities to influence politics 
before Citizens United, and so the decision’s net impact will 
likely be minor.17 But one impact of Citizens United is already 
certain: The case has galvanized a political movement to amend 
the Constitution to strip corporations of at least some First 
Amendment protection.18 
 
 15. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 16. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Decision That Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, May 13, 2010, at 63; Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Jan. 28, 2010, at 39 . 
 17. See Michael C. Dorf, The Marginality of Citizens United, CORNELL J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 739 (2011). 
 18. See Letter from Jeffrey D. Clements et al. to Hon. Patrick Leahy et al. (Oct. 4, 
2010), available at http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/finalfsfppfaw.pdf. The 
letter of attorneys and law professors urges Congress to “explore all potential remedies, 
including proposals for a 28th Amendment,” but does not specify the content of such an 
Amendment. 
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Such an amendment could be worded as follows: “This 
Constitution shall not be construed to afford free speech rights 
to anyone other than natural persons and artificial entities 
formed for the specific purpose of communication.” I would 
include some artificial entities in an amendment restricting 
corporate speech because such entities may be essential to 
facilitating the speech of natural persons. Of course, an 
amendment of this sort would require private actors, judges, and 
other government officials to draw some difficult lines about 
what counts as a protected artificial entity, but such line-drawing 
is inherent in the law, and does not strike me as qualitatively 
more difficult in this area than in any other. A bolder effort to 
de-personify artificial entities (which I do not favor) might strip 
such entities of all constitutional protection. 
Dead people present other issues. The dead may have direct 
constitutional rights. Thus, although no Supreme Court case 
directly addresses the issue, it is possible to imagine recognition 
for a limited property or “privacy” right in a dead body. Other 
sub-constitutional laws and doctrines—such as the common law 
of attorney-client privilege19 and the state law of wills—grant 
substantial recognition to the interests of the dead. But these 
protections do not strike me as excessive. 
However, the political preferences of the dead have a very 
large impact on our law and politics. Because we are so 
accustomed to thinking of the “dead hand” problem as a 
metaphor, it is easy to forget that it is more than that. The 
continuation on the books of laws passed decades or centuries 
ago means that we are, in an important sense, ruled by decisions 
taken by people who are long dead. For statutes and other sub-
constitutional law, the ability of contemporary majoritarian 
processes to repeal or modify old laws reduces the influence of 
the dead. Because of the difficulty of overcoming legislative 
inertia and the baroque structure of the federal lawmaking 
process under Article I, § 7, the dead retain substantial influence 
over sub-constitutional law. But we might think that such 
influence is justified, or at least tolerable, on Burkean or other 
grounds that favor the claims of stability over the claims of 
contemporary values. Yet the very high bar for constitutional 
amendment—impossibly high in the case of the fundamental 
matter of representation in the Senate—makes Burkean and like 
 
 19. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
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justifications untenable as a defense of the dead’s continuing 
influence. 
I can make the point most clearly with a thought 
experiment. Suppose that the Constitution was not adopted in 
1789 but in Roman times, or suppose that despite repeated 
efforts to abolish the Senate, the equal-suffrage clause prevented 
such a change, leaving the Constitution in place in the year 4000. 
Unless one independently thought that the equal-suffrage clause 
was a worthwhile principle of political justice that trumps 
contemporary consensus, could its adoption thousands of years 
earlier by a very different society possibly justify its retention? 
Absent revolution or resort to amendment outside of 
Article V,20 the near-impossibility of amending the Senate and 
the difficulty of amendment more generally mean that any 
proposal to make the Constitution easier to amend is unrealistic 
as a practical proposal. A constitutional requirement that laws 
sunset would address the problem of statutory rule by the dead, 
but that problem seems to me not nearly so acute as the 
difficulty of amending the Constitution itself. 
Thus, the dead-hand problem reduces to the following core 
question of constitutional design: How difficult (and difficult in 
exactly what way) should it be to amend a constitution? Rather 
than trying to specify an ideal amendment procedure, I will 
simply conclude by noting that this kind of structural question is, 
in an important sense, also a question about who comprises the 
polity. No less than the amendments expanding the franchise, 
Article V reflects at least a tacit judgment about who We the 
People are. That is quite possibly a bad judgment, but it is a 
judgment nonetheless. 
 
 
 20. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
